Everything We Know About How the FBI Hacks People

SOURCE: https://bit.ly/1qlvbXz

Recent headlines warn that the government now has greater authority to hack your computers, in and outside the US. Changes to federal criminal court procedures known as Rule 41 are to blame; they vastly expand how and whom the FBI can legally hack. But just like the NSA’s hacking operations, FBI hacking isn’t new. In fact, the bureau has a long history of surreptitiously hacking us, going back two decades.

That history is almost impossible to document, however, because the hacking happens mostly in secret. Search warrants granting permission to hack get issued using vague, obtuse language that hides what’s really happening, and defense attorneys rarely challenge the hacking tools and techniques in court. There’s also no public accounting of how often the government hacks people. Although federal and state judges have to submit a report to Congress tracking the number and nature of wiretap requests they process each year, no similar requirement exists for hacking tools. As a result, little is known about the invasive tools the bureau, and other law enforcement agencies, use or how they use them. But occasionally, tidbits of information do leak out in court cases and news stories.

A look at a few of these cases offers a glimpse at how FBI computer intrusion techniques have developed over the years. Note that the government takes issue with the word “hacking,” since this implies unauthorized access, and the government’s hacking is court-sanctioned. Instead it prefers the terms “remote access searches” and Network Investigative Techniques, or NIT. By whatever name, however, the activity is growing.

1998: The Short But Dramatic Life of Carnivore

The FBI’s first known computer surveillance tool was a traffic sniffer named Carnivore that got installed on network backbones—with the permission of internet service providers. The unfortunately named tool was custom-built to filter and copy metadata and/or the content of communications to and from a surveillance target. The government had already used it about 25 times, beginning in 1998, when the public finally learned about it in 2000 after Earthlink refused to let the FBI install the tool on its network. Earthlink feared the sniffer would give the feds unfettered access to all customer communications. A court battle and congressional hearing ensued, which sparked a fierce and divisive debate, making Carnivore the Apple/FBI case of its day.

The FBI insisted to Congress that its precision filters prevented anything but the target’s communications from being collected. But Carnivore’s descriptive name seemed to defy that, and an independent review ultimately found that the system was “capable of broad sweeps” if incorrectly configured. The reviewers also found that Carnivore lacked both the protections to prevent someone from configuring it this way and the capability to track who did it if the configuration got changed.

By 2005, the FBI had replaced Carnivore with commercial filters, but was still using other custom-built collection tools in the Carnivore family. But all of these network surveillance tools had one problem, the same issue plaguing law enforcement agencies today: encryption. FBI agents could use tools to siphon all the data they wanted as it crossed various networks, but if the data was encrypted, they couldn’t read it.

Enter key loggers designed to circumvent encryption by capturing keystrokes as a surveillance target typed, before encryption kicked in.

1999: How a Mob Boss Helped Birth the Fed’s Computer Surveillance

Cosa Nostra mob boss Nicodemo Salvatore Scarfo, Jr., was the first criminal suspect known to be targeted by a government keystroke logger in 1999. Scarfo was using encryption to protect his communications, and the FBI used a key logger—which was likely a commercially made tool—to capture his PGP encryption key. Unlike key loggers today which can be remotely installed, however, the FBI had to physically break into Scarfo’s office twice to install the logger on his computer and retrieve it, since Scarfo was using a dial-up internet connection that prevented authorities from reaching his computer remotely.

The FBI apparently went rogue in using the tool, however, because a government memo from 2002 (.pdf) recently obtained by MIT national security researcher Ryan Shapiro revealed that the Justice Department was irked that the Bureau had “risked a classified technique on an unworth [sic] target.”

Scarfo challenged the surveillance, arguing in a motion that the feds needed a wiretap order to capture the content of his communications and that a search warrant was insufficient. His lawyers sought information about the keylogger, but the government insisted the technology—which was already being used in the wild by hackers—was classified for national security reasons. It’s one of the same excuses the government uses today to keep a veil over its surveillance tools and techniques.

2001: Magic Lantern

The Scarfo case evidently convinced the feds that they needed to develop their own custom hacking tools, and in 2001, reporters got wind of Magic Lantern, the code name for an FBI keylogger that apparently went beyond what the government had used against Scarfo, since this one could be installed remotely. (A former lawyer for Scarfo who has asked to remain anonymous says Magic Lantern was not the tool used on the mob boss, though he doesn’t know the name of the tool that was.)

In addition to keystrokes, this new tool also recorded web browsing history, usernames and passwords and listed all the internet-facing ports open on a machine. It may have been used for the first time in Operation Trail Mix, an investigation of an animal rights group that occurred in 2002 and 2003. As recently revealed by the New York Times, the FBI used a tool to get around the encryption one suspect in the case was using; although the tool was never identified in court documents, it’s believed to have been a keystroke logger. “This was the first time that the Department of Justice had ever approved such an intercept of this type,” an FBI agent wrote about the tool in a 2005 email obtained by Shapiro this year.

After the news about Magic Lantern leaked in 2001, the government managed to keep a tight lid on its hacking tools and techniques for nearly a decade.

2009: Finally More Information Leaks Out

In 2009, the public finally got a more comprehensive view of FBI hacking when WIRED obtained a cache of government documents through a FOIA request. The documents described a surveillance tool called CIPAV—Computer and Internet Protocol Address Verifier—designed to collect a computer’s IP and MAC address, an inventory of all open ports and software installed on the machine, as well as registry information, the username of anyone logged in and the last URL visited by the machine. All of this data got sent to the FBI over the internet. CIPAV apparently didn’t come with a keystroke logger, however, and didn’t collect the contents of communication. Many in the security community believe that CIPAV, which has been around for at least as long as Magic Lantern and is still used today, is Magic Lantern by another name, minus the keystroke logger component.

The tool helped identify an extortionist in 2004 who was cutting phone and internet cables and demanding money from telecoms to stop. In 2007 it was used to unmask a teen who was e-mailing bomb threats to a high school in Washington state. And it’s been used in various other cases, ranging from hacker investigations to terrorism and foreign spying cases, all for the primary purpose of unmasking the IP address of targets who used anonymizing services to hide their identity and location.

It was apparently so popular that a federal prosecutor complained (.pdf) in 2002 that it was being used too much. “While the technique is of indisputable value in certain kinds of cases,” he wrote, “we are seeing indications that it is being used needlessly by some agencies, unnecessarily raising difficult legal questions (and a risk of suppression) without any countervailing benefit.” In other words, the more it got used, the more likely defense attorneys would learn about it and file legal objections to throw out evidence collected with it.

2012: Stepping Up the Hacking Game

But hacking surveillance targets one at a time is too time-consuming when a crime involves many suspects. So in 2012 the government borrowed a favorite trick of the criminal hacker trade: drive-by downloads, also known as watering hole attacks. These involve embedding spyware on a website where criminal suspects congregate so the computers of all visitors to the site get infected. It has become a favorite government tactic for unmasking visitors to child porn sites hosted with Tor Hidden Services, which can only be accessed using the Tor anonymizing browser, which conceals the real IP address of users. To infect suspect machines, the feds first gain control of servers hosting the sites, then embed their spyware in one of the site’s pages.

They apparently used a watering hole attack for the first time in Operation Torpedo, a sting operation aimed at unmasking anonymous visitors to three child porn sites hosted on servers in Nebraska in 2012.

They repeated the tactic in 2013 with Freedom Hosting, a provider of anonymous web hosting services that included child porn sites among its customers. In August that year after the FBI seized control of Freedom Hosting’s servers, all the sites the company hosted displayed a “Down for Maintenance” page with hidden Javascript code embedded in it. The code exploited a Firefox security hole to cause infected computers to reveal their real IP address to the FBI. There was just one problem with the tactic, however. Freedom Hosting wasn’t just hosting child porn sites; it also hosted legitimate businesses, and customers to those sites may have been infected too. It’s not known how many innocent bystanders may have been hooked in the hack, however, since the government has never revealed how the operation worked.

The FBI and international partners used a similar tactic last year to target more than 4,000 machines belonging to members and would-be members of the child porn site Playpen. The FBI, for its part, identified the real IP addresses of some 1,300 Playpen visitors, of which about 137 have been charged with crimes.

Big Questions Remain

For all that we now know about government hacking, there’s so much more that we still don’t know. For example, what exactly is the government doing with these tools? Are they just grabbing IP addresses and information from a computer’s registry? Or are they doing more invasive things—like activating the webcam to take pictures of anyone using a targeted machine, as they sought to do in a 2013 case? How are the tools tested to make sure they don’t damage the machines they infect? The latter is particularly important if the government installs any tool on the machines of botnet victims, as the recent Rule 41 changes suggest they might do.

Author: Amanda Walker

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